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Abstract A folk theorem which holds for all repeated matching games is established.
The folk theorem holds any time the stage game payoffs of any two players are not
affinely equivalent. The result is independent of population size and matching rule—
including rules that depend on players choices or the history of play.
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1 Introduction
A standard economic interaction has many buyers choosing among many sellers.
Hence the folk theorem, while an astonishing result, is irrelevant because it assumes a
small group of players who must interact. This paper shows that the folk theorem can
be applied to standard economic models if players know each others’ reputation.
This paper is a contribution to a research agenda developed in Okuno-Fujiwara
and Postlewaite (1995) and Kandori (1992). Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995)
formalize the strategies used here and show that if there is a continuum of buyers and
sellers, the folk theorem holds. Kandori (1992) extends these results to finite popu-
lations if the matching is random. Unfortunately choice is integral to most economic
models and, as will be shown in an example, Kandori’s strategy fails if even one
player chooses with whom to interact, his “partner.” Thus this paper establishes a folk
theorem when people choose their partners.
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The equilibria will use only local information processing—or information players
could learn from the people with whom they have interacted (Okuno-Fujiwara and
Postlewaite 1995). This restriction is essential if the equilibria found here are to be
applied to real matching games. If players are at geographically diffused locations then
communication will be difficult. Without this restriction there would have to be a large
and active central information processor dispersing information every period; such
structures are both rarely observed and technically infeasible. The restriction imposed
by local information processing leads to two refinements of sequential equilibrium.
Just as positing a central information processor is implausible, it is equally implau-
sible to go to the other extreme and deny the presence of rumors, newspapers, etcetera.
Thus we require information not available through local information processing to be
irrelevant, in other words the strategies must be straightforward (Kandori 1992). The
importance of this restriction is demonstrated in Hasker (2001a) which shows that even
a trivial amount of central information processing can rule out trigger strategies and
simple optimal penal codes.
Since the matching rule, especially with choice-driven matching, would not always
be clear from local information, we must also require equilibria to be independent of the
matching rule—or universal (Kandori 1992).1 This requirement also includes that the
strategy must work for all finite populations; a desirable and nearly trivial characteristic
once the strategy works for all matching rules. Despite these requirements a folk
theorem is established with the weakest sufficient condition from the standard repeated
game literature (Abreu et al. 1994).
The second section of the paper presents the model. Then in Sect. 3, an example
shows why Kandori’s strategy does not work with choice-driven matching even though
it satisfies the refinements. In that section some notation is developed that makes the
folk theorem simple to prove. Section 4 contains the proof and Sect. 5 the conclusion.
2 The model
In a matching game there are I populations, Pi for all i ∈ I , each with J members
where J and I are both finite. Let j denote a generic member of Pi . Players are
matched by a one-shot matching rule µ0 : Pi → ×k∈I\i Pk such that the projection
of µ0 on Pk is one-to-one.2 The set of µ0 is M0 and the set of players matched with
player j ∈ Pi is denoted µ ( j). When all players are matched they play a stage game.
In the stage game, each j ∈ Pi has a finite action set, Ai , and payoff function:
πi : ×k∈I Ak → R. An action profile is written a = {ai , a−i } where ai ∈ Ai and
a−i ∈ ×k∈I\i Ak . Without loss of generality, players use correlated actions from the
set A = (×i∈I Ai ). In this paper the minmax action is “not interacting,” denoted Ni .
1 While the terminology is new to the present paper, this refinement is used in Kandori (1992).
2 Note that the choice of i is arbitrary. Two examples of common matching rules:
a. Choose one person at a time from Pi , and let her select one player from those not already matched in
each Pk k ∈ I\i. This is a model of employers hiring employees.
b. Let each player from Pk k ∈ I\i choose a member of Pi who has not already been chosen by someone
else in Pk . This is a model of customers choosing a supplier.
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We assume that for all a−i ∈ ×k∈I\i Ak πi (Ni , a−i ) = 0 and that if N−i = {Nk}k∈I\i ,
then for all ai ∈ Ai , πi (ai , N−i ) = 0.
In a repeated matching game the matching game happens ad infinitum. A path
is a sequence of action profiles w = {at}∞t=1, at ∈ A. A player’s payoff from such




with δ ∈ [0, 1). A
matching rule, µ, is a sequence of one-shot matching rules. If it is independent of
history, we call it a random matching game. Such a sequence is a list µ = {µt}∞t=1
where µt ∈ (M0). If it depends on history, it is a repeated matching game. In
this case, let Ht be the set of possible histories of the entire game up to period t , then
µ = {µt}∞t=1 µt : Ht → (M0).
The strategies we analyze are called social norms; a social norm is a tuple β =
{Z , σ, τ } where:
1. Z ≡ ×i∈I Zi where Zi is a finite set, the elements of Z denote the social statuses
of players in Pi ;
2. σ ≡ {σi }i∈I where σi : Z → Ai determines the behavior of a player j ∈ Pi as a
function of the social status of the players with whom he is matched, and is called
the social standard of behavior;
3. τ ≡ {τi }i∈I where τi : Ai × Ai × Zi × Z → Zi is a transition rule that
determines j’s social status in period t . It is a composition of an internal rule
(τ ni ) and an external rule (τ
x
i ) where;
(a) τ ni : Ai × Ai × Zi → Zi . The first element is the action person j ∈ Pi took
last period (denoted at−1j ), the second element is the action they should have
taken given the outcome of the correlating device (denoted σ t−1j ). The third is
j’s social status last period (zt−1j ). The output is the the interim social status of
j ∈ Pi , denoted ζ tj ∈ Zi .




l∈ j∪µ( j) ∈ Z—the interim social statuses
of the people that have been matched this period. This part of the rule resolves
any possible conflicts between their social statuses. In practice it will “forgive”
people who ahve deviated earlier in time.
This transition rule restricts the strategy to local information processing since it
is only affected by information about j and the people with whom j is matched.
We will look for sequential equilibria that satisfy the two refinements mentioned
in the introduction: straightforwardness and universality. Since sequential equilibria
were originally defined for finite action games, this paper uses Abreu et al. (1990)
extension to repeated games. They define a strategy as a complete contingent plan for
future behavior; this is given by β in our notation. However Z and τ are not under
the control of players; thus what we check is if σ is a best response given appropriate
beliefs. The appropriate beliefs are any that are straightforward. Straightforwardness
essentially requires that the strategy is a best response for all feasible beliefs. Denote
h jt as the part of the history of the game that j ∈ Pi has directly observed, and let ι jt







and ι jt−1 ⊆ ι jt .
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always a best response given any beliefs consistent with any feasible ι jt and given that
all other players use the strategy β.






⊆ ι jt and ι jt−1 ⊆ ι jt —are
included only because this paper does not address the issue of forgetting. It is conjec-







Notice as well that ι jt can include ht and the matching rule (full information) and a
player can believe that all other players also have full information.
The second refinement is universality.
Definition 2 An equilibrium is universal if it is an equilibrium for all matching rules
and population sizes.
When we refer to an equilibrium, we mean a sequential equilibrium which is
straightforward and universal. Notice that the beliefs required for a sequential equili-
brium are given by the straightforward refinement. A static Nash equilibrium is an
equilibrium of the repeated matching game when the discount factor (δ) is zero.
3 Illustrating the impact of choice
In this section we present an example of a social norm that works if matching is random
but fails when matching is driven by players’ preferences (or is history dependent).
This example not only demonstrates the impact of choice-driven matching, but it also
enables the development and explanation of some notation that will simplify the proof
of the folk theorem. The stage game is the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma with the option
of not interacting explicitly included.
2
C2 D2 N2
1 C1 2, 2 −2, 4 0, 0
D1 4,−2 0, 0 0, 0
N1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
(1)
The social norm we use is the strategy used in Kandori (1992) to prove the folk
theorem with random matching. Players have three possible social statuses, Z1 =













2 if at−1j = σ t−1j
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{C1, C2} if zt1 = 0, zt2 = 0{C1, D2} if zt1 > 0, zt2 = 0{D1, C2} if zt1 = 0, zt2 > 0{D1, D2} if zt1 > 0, zt2 > 0
. (3)
Notice the asymmetry of the strategy when a deviating player meets with a non-
deviator. Players who have recently deviated “repent” by playing Ci while their
opponent plays D−i . In a random matching environment, this means that a non-deviator
always gets at least the payoff from {Ci , C−i }; thus non-deviators have an incentive
to cooperate.
However this strategy also makes players who have deviated desirable partners since
πi (Di , C−i ) > πi (Ci , C−i ). With choice-driven matching, this can cause deviators to
deviate again. To illustrate this, we need to first describe a matching rule. The matching
rule will reward players who have not deviated recently by giving them first choice of
partner. This means that players who have not deviated will be matched with players
who have deviated recently since they will get the payoff of πi (Di , C−i ). When the
players are indifferent we assume first they prefer to be matched with someone who
has deviated fewer times in the past, and then we assume that they prefer to interact
with their partner from the last period.
To formally specify this matching rule, first define Btj as the number of times player
j ∈ Pi has deviated in the past. Let ztj∗ = minl∈P1×P2 ztl , and assume that j∗ was
randomly chosen to be matched first. Then j∗ will be matched with someone with
ztl ≥ 1 if available. If there is either no one or more than one person who satisfies this
criterion then the tie-breaking rule is that the player will be matched with someone
who has the least Btl . If there is more than one person who satisfies all criteria above, j
∗
will first be matched with whomever she was matched with last period and otherwise
use randomization. This process is repeated among all players who have not been
matched until there is no one left to be matched.
I now explain how this matching rule maximizes the utilities of players who have
recently deviated less often. Having players with ztl ≥ 1 be matched with players
who have ztj∗ = 0 clearly maximizes j∗’s utility as explained above. Here I illustrate
beliefs that generate the tie-breaking rules. The first tie-breaking rule is that players
prefer to be matched with players who have deviated fewer times. If players believe
that the probability a given player l will deviate again is limε→0 ε(B
t
l +1)−1 , then they
will have these preferences. Given this, the relative likelihood of player m deviating
again to player l deviating again is:
lim
ε→0 ε
(Btl −Btm)(Btm+1)−1(Btl +1)−1 ∈ {0, 1,∞} (4)
and if Btl < B
t
m , then m is infinitely more likely to deviate again than l, and therefore l
is a more desirable player to be matched with. The second tie-breaking rule is that
players prefer to be matched with the same person again. These beliefs could easily be
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On a priori grounds this seems a reasonable matching rule as it is designed to reward
the ‘less guilty.’ However a problem arises because one implication of straightforward-
ness is that it is possible for players to always know what subgame3 they are in. Thus
they know when the tie-breaking rules will be invoked, and in a simple subgame, this
matching rule actually gives players an incentive to deviate.
To show this, let P1 and P2 have two members; and consider the subgame where
three people deviated last period and there have been no previous deviations. Assume
both players in P1 deviated and consider the player in P1 matched with the player in
P2 who did not deviate. If this player cooperates today, her continuation value is:
δ
(
π1 (C1, D2) + δπ1 (C1, C2) + δ
2
1 − δ π1 (C1, C2)
)
. (5)
If she deviates today, then she will not be matched with the one non-deviator, and her
continuation value will be:
δ
(
π1 (D1, D2) + δπ1 (C1, D2) + δ
2
1 − δ π1 (C1, C2)
)
. (6)
This means that cooperating only increases her continuation value by δ (−2 + δ4).
The incentive to deviate in the current period is 2 = π1 (D1, D2) − π1 (C1, D2) , and
since δ (−2 + δ4) < 2, deviating is the best response. Thus this strategy is not an
equilibrium. Notice that this counter-example did not actually require much choice.
In the proper subgame it only requires that one person choose her partner to generate
this contradiction.
How then to find an equilibrium? Given that each new matching rule can give
different incentives, and the set of possible matching rules expands with the population
size, when can one be sure that enough cases have been checked? In fact it is only
necessary to check the worst case, where the incentive to deviate is highest. The
player who cooperates in this case always will. To find this case, one finds two partial
matching rules: one which gives the least possible value when a player cooperates
(atj = σ tj ) and another which gives the highest possible value when a player deviates
(atj = σ tj ).
These worst and best partial matching rules are equivalent to worst and best paths,
and to find these, we need to define the set of possible future paths of play:
























⊆ A∞ be the cylinder of future action
sequences consistent with all players using the social norm β given a finite population

















3 Here “subgame” refers to a subgame of the repeated matching game with full information.
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Notice that for an arbitrary social norm these sets might be quite complex—in fact
they can be open—but for the social norms used in this paper these sets will be closed
and have a simple structure. When these sets are not too complex, there will be a finite
population size that supports all of the possible paths; and the matching rule is the
one that gives the least incentive in each period for a player to cooperate. For example
with Kandori’s strategy these sets are:
if atj = σ tj ztj ≤ 1 W1
(







if atj = σ tj ztj = 2 W1
(
















w1 = {σ t+1 = {C1, C2} , σ t+s = {C1, C2} for s ≥ 2
}
w2 = {σ t+1 = {D1, C2} , σ t+s = {C1, C2} for s ≥ 2
}
w3 = {σ t+1 = {C1, D2} , σ t+s = {C1, C2} for s ≥ 2
}
(8)
w4 = {σ t+1 = {D1, D2} , σ t+s = {C1, C2} for s ≥ 2
}
w5 = {σ t+1 = {C1, D2} , σ t+2 = {C1, D2} , σ t+s = {C1, C2} for s ≥ 3
}
w6 = {σ t+1 = {D1, D2} , σ t+2 = {C1, D2} , σ t+s = {C1, C2} for s ≥ 3
}
.
One can achieve any pair of paths in these sets if there are two players in each po-

















and the value in equation 5 is δv1
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ficient to ensure cooperation. Once I found it was not then it was a simple matter to
backtrack and find a matching rule that supports these payoffs.
The reader can also see the difference between random matching and choice-driven
matching using this example. Under random matching a player expecting the path w3








)) = δ24 is sufficient
when δ ≥ 0.71. On the other hand, with choice-driven matching it is easier to check
if a strategy is an equilibrium. Under random matching, for each status profile the
analyst must check two possible continuation paths—or more for more complicated



















is high enough to ensure
cooperation is always sufficient to prove a strategy is an equilibrium. In a working








is closed and can be supported by




4 A folk theorem allowing for choice
Only one modification of Kandori’s social norm is required to make it an equilibrium
with choice-driven matching. If the social status found above was an interim social
status—ζ tj —and it was further required that only the latest deviators in any interaction
be punished (by an external transition rule) then this would be an equilibrium. Howe-
ver this would still leave us with a folk theorem that works only for interactions where
punishments hurt one person without hurting others; excluding common and intuitive
punishments like not interacting. Quite surprisingly a simple modification of the stra-
tegy in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) using technics from Abreu et al. (1994) proves
a folk theorem with the weakest sufficient condition in the folk theorem literature:
Definition 4 A stage game satisfies non-equivalent utilities (NEU) if for every i
and k = i ({i, k} ⊆ I ) there is no α ≥ 0 and β ∈ R such that for all a ∈ A
πi (a) = απk (a) + β.
Abreu et al. (1994) show that this is equivalent to the existence of asymmetric













and k ∈ I\i .














i∈I such that i
gets a lower payoff from the action profile ai than a0 or ak for k ∈ I\i . This is done
by using the public randomizing device to correlate over a0, bi , and the worst payoff
of population i as is shown in Abreu et al. (1994).













a0 if ∀l ∈ Pk ∩ ( j ∪ µ ( j)) ztl = 0
ak if ∃l ∈ Pk ∩ ( j ∪ µ ( j)) ztl > 0
(9)















if ∀l ∈ Pk ∩ ( j ∪ µ ( j)) ztk ≤ 1 . (10)
The transition rule is a two step function τ = {τ n, τ x }. The internal updating rule is:












T + 1 if at−1j = σ t−1j
zt−1j − 1 if at−1j = σ t−1j and zt−1j > 1
zt−1j else
(11)
and the external updating rule is:
ztj = τ xi =
{
0 ∃l ∈ µ ( j) ζ tj ≤ ζ tl
ζ tj ∀l ∈ µ ( j) ζ tj > ζ tl . (12)
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In this strategy a deviator faces a two tiered punishment. First she is minmaxed for T
periods and then always plays ai . The critical difference between this and Kandori’s
strategy is that players are “forgiven” (ztj = 0) if they interact with someone who
deviated in a later period. Define A+ = {a|a ∈ A, ∀i , πi (a) > 0}.
Theorem 5 If the stage game satisfies the NEU conditions, then as δ → 1, every
a0 ∈ A+ can be supported as the equilibrium initial path of a social norm.













for all ztj and a
t





; then if ztj = 0 we have vi
(








. If ztj = 1, the worst
possible future depends on the discount factor; it is either vi
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but for sufficiently high δ
vi
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Likewise if ztj = ẑtj > 1 the worst future depends on the discount factor; but for
sufficiently high δ vi
(














Now limT →∞ limδ→1 vi
(










= ∞ thus choose T so that a
persons with ztj = 1 will cooperate. Since limδ→1 vi
(











if ztj = 0 the player will cooperate for sufficiently high δ. And since {Ni }i∈I is a static
Nash equilibrium and for ẑtj > 1 vi
(














if ztj = ẑtj the
player will cooperate. 
If players do not have the option of not interacting, this folk theorem can easily
be extended if the minmax is in pure strategies or if mixed strategies are observable.
As well the correlating device can be removed like in Fudenberg and Maskin (1991),
provided that all cycles depend on the period and not the time since deviation.
5 Conclusion
We can now see that the folk theorem does apply to ordinary market interactions,
the type that are standard in economic analysis. We understand how Consumers and
Suppliers, Laborers and Employers, and people involved in other standard compe-
titive matching games can reap both the benefits and the costs of the folk theorem.
Furthermore this folk theorem has simple existence conditions, compensating for the
complex nature of these interactions. The results depend only on the payoffs of the
stage game and the frequency of interaction.
There are two potential research extensions. The author has addressed one of these
in a working paper that deals with how to remove the assumption that players know
each other’s reputations. In Hasker (2001b) it is shown that this can be replaced with
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formalized references; analyzing what can be done with letters and other verifiable
messages make it possible to remove this assumption. A second desirable extension
would be the study of accommodating heterogeneity—since this is a primary moti-
vation for matching. Clearly a reasonable amount of heterogeneity would be easily
overcome, and the author conjectures that even significant heterogeneity, as in Dutta
(1995), could be overcome if the social norm is independent of this heterogeneity.
Dealing with this more difficult case would be an interesting topic for future research.
Even in these more complex environments, social norms are simple to follow. A
concern of many theorists is the compositional complexity of equilibria. Social norms
are simple; as Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995) point out, it is easier to follow
a social norm than calculate best responses in many situations. No computation is
required to determine the optimal choice, one simply follows the rules. Players can
blithely live their lives knowing that whatever happens they should just do as they are
told.
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